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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
Appellant Mumia Abu-Jamal was convicted of murdering 
a Philadelphia police officer and is currently on death row 
at the State Correctional Institute at Greene. The 
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections has a rule that 
prohibits inmates from carrying on a business or 
profession. Jamal alleges that this rule is unconstitutional 
and that the Department used this rule as a pretext to 
retaliate against him for the content of his writings, radio 
commentaries, and his book, Live From Death Row, which 
he wrote while at the State Correctional Institution at 
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Huntingdon. He alleges that this retaliation included 
opening, reading and distributing his legal mail by 
Department officials and denying visits by his paralegals. 
 
Jamal filed suit against the Department and 
Superintendent James Price seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. S1983. He claims that the 
Department violated his rights under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments, and challenges the business or 
profession rule. He sought a preliminary injunction to 
prevent the Department from investigating violations of, 
and enforcing its business or profession rule against him. 
When he made the motion, Jamal was serving a prison 
disciplinary sentence for engaging in the profession of 
journalism at S.C.I. Greene. 
 
The district court denied Jamal's motion for a preliminary 
injunction against the enforcement of the business or 
profession rule, but granted a limited injunction against the 
opening of Jamal's legal mail. The court held that the 
disciplinary proceedings and the Department's decision to 
open Jamal's mail were not motivated by retaliation for 
Jamal's writings. Instead, the district court held that the 
Department initiated these actions after it suspected that 
Jamal had entered into a contract with a publisher for 
compensation. The trial court also denied Jamal's motion to 
rescind disciplinary action for violating the business or 
profession rule. The court, however, enjoined the reading, 
photocopying, distributing or collection of his legal mail, 
except to "investigate the violation of prison regulations or 
other misconduct." Finally, the court denied Jamal's motion 
to enjoin the Department from requiring paralegals to be 
trained or licensed and to work under contract with the 
attorneys, concluding that the Department had valid, 
nonretaliatory reasons for enforcing the visitation rule.1 
Jamal appeals. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Department also denied media requests for interviews from 
February through June of 1995. During that time, the Department 
granted media requests for other inmates. The district court found that 
the Department's justifications for denying media access to Jamal were 
not credible, and concluded that this action was clearly retaliatory. The 
district court granted an injunction prohibiting further denials of media 
access. This order is not challenged on appeal. 
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We conclude that Jamal has a reasonable probability of 
demonstrating that the Department's actions violated his 
rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and 
that Jamal has demonstrated that he will be subject to 
irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted. 
Accordingly, we will reverse, and remand the cause to the 
district court with instructions to enjoin the investigation 
and enforcement of the business or profession policy as it 
pertains to Jamal. We affirm the district court's order 
insofar as it denied Jamal's motion to enjoin the 
Department's visitation restrictions. 
 
I. 
 
Jamal worked as a journalist before his conviction, and 
he has continued to write articles while incarcerated. 
Approximately forty publications carried articles under 
Jamal's byline on a regular basis while he was incarcerated 
at S.C.I. Huntingdon. Supporters would send copies of 
Jamal's published articles via regular prison mail. S.C.I. 
Huntingdon corrections officers opened and searched these 
articles as part of screening procedures. For instance, on 
one occasion, the superintendent of S.C.I. Huntingdon 
commended Jamal for a Yale Law Journal article. See 
Mumia Abu-Jamal, Teetering on the Brink: Between Death 
and Life, 100 Yale L.J. 993 (1991). Jamal received 
compensation for the Yale article, and for other articles 
published by The Nation, Covert Action, and Against the 
Current. Department officials were not aware, however, that 
Jamal was paid for any other publications. 
 
In July of 1992, Jamal recorded an extensive interview 
with the Prison Radio Project, which aired in segments 
featured as commentaries from Jamal. Jamal did not 
receive compensation for these interviews. The Prison Radio 
Project wrote a letter to the assistant superintendent in 
August of 1992 requesting permission to regularly tape and 
air commentaries by Jamal, who would be introduced as a 
correspondent. In the same letter, the Project informed the 
Department that they were "in the process of approaching 
publishers with a book proposal." 
 
The Department denied the Project's request to tape 
regular commentaries, stating that "it does not permit 
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inmates to conduct or participate in regularly scheduled 
news broadcasts or commentary." In April 1994, National 
Public Radio also interviewed Jamal, and intended to use 
the recordings as commentaries critical of prison life, 
among other topics. NPR paid Jamal for these interviews, 
which focused considerable media attention on Jamal's 
case. Several members of the public and the Fraternal 
Order of Police contacted the Department to express 
outrage that a convicted murderer could benefit from his 
status. 
 
As a result of the complaints, the Department began to 
"investigate" whether Jamal was violating the business or 
profession rule, despite the fact that Jamal freely admitted 
that he was writing and publishing his works. It instituted 
a "mail watch" in August of 1994, which is separate and 
distinct from the routine search of incoming personal mail. 
Under a mail watch, corrections officers were entitled to 
open Jamal's legal mail outside of his presence. 
 
The business or profession rule states, in relevant part: 
 
       "No inmate is permitted to incorporate or engage in a 
       business or profession while under the supervision of 
       the Department of Corrections except as indicated  
       below.2 An inmate who is engaged in a business or 
       profession prior to incarceration is expected to assign 
       authority for the operation of such business or 
       profession to a person in the community." 
 
(footnote added). The Department contends that it reviewed 
Jamal's legal mail specifically to determine whether one of 
Jamal's attorneys was helping him obtain compensation for 
his writing and commentaries, even though the business or 
profession rule applies irrespective of whether Jamal is 
compensated. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The exceptions to this rule allow inmates to continue to make major 
decisions, on occasion, that substantially affect their businesses; and 
allow unsentenced inmates, inmates on work release, and inmates in 
community corrections programs, to continue to practice a business or 
profession provided their work does not impose a burden on prison 
administration. 
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Department of Corrections officials opened Jamal's legal 
mail, copied it, and sent it to David Horwitz, assistant 
general counsel of the Department of Corrections. Horwitz 
read the letters in their entirety, and concluded that they 
were not relevant to the Department's investigation. In the 
face of this conclusion, and even though Horwitz 
determined that the letters were pertinent to Jamal's state 
appeals, Horwitz forwarded them to Chief Counsel Young 
and to Brian Gottlieb, Deputy Counsel in the Office of the 
General Counsel--the office charged with advising the 
Governor of Pennsylvania on, among other things, signing 
death warrants. 
 
The Department forwarded three letters from Jamal's 
attorneys to the governor's office. Two of those letters, dated 
August 16, 1994 and August 23, 1994, were from Jamal's 
lead attorney in his state appeal and contained a candid 
discussion of the merits of his claim and sensitive 
information regarding the defense strategy. The third letter, 
dated August 25, 1994 had been written by staff counsel on 
Jamal's state appeal, and also discussed his case. The 
Department continued a "mail watch" on Jamal's legal mail 
from August 1994, until Jamal filed this lawsuit, and 
confiscated and copied various incoming and outgoing 
letters. When Jamal filed his motion for a preliminary 
injunction, he had entered into a contract with Emerge 
Magazine to submit an article. The Department continued 
its investigation of Jamal. 
 
In September 1994, the Department became suspicious 
of the number of people admitted as paralegals for legal 
visits with Jamal. Jamal's attorney designated six legal 
assistants. Among these were Noelle Hanrahan, who was 
also working with Jamal as part of the Prison Radio Project; 
Jeannette Patton and Bobby Blocker, who were involved in 
fund-raising for Jamal's legal defense; and Jamila Levi, who 
calls herself Jamal's "spiritual sister" and had visited Jamal 
in the past. Levi visited Jamal as a social visitor in October 
1993 and began visiting as a paralegal in October 1994. In 
January of 1995, she was admitted as a social guest. In 
February of 1995, she was admitted as a paralegal four 
times. Levi marked herself as "friend" in the prison's 
visitors book even when she was admitted for legal visits, 
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and had written articles complaining of the limits imposed 
upon social visits for death row inmates. 
 
In a February 24, 1995 letter, the Department wrote to 
Jamal's attorney: "it is not sufficient merely to designate 
persons as investigators and paralegals unless the 
identified individuals can produce documentation that they 
are, in fact, licensed investigators or credentialed paralegals 
acting under contract with, or as employees of the 
attorney." These requirements went beyond those set forth 
in prison regulations.3 Levi was not licensed as an 
investigator, had no legal training, was not employed by 
Jamal's attorney, and was not receiving compensation for 
her visits. Levi was denied admission as a paralegal on 
February 28, 1995. 
 
II. 
 
We must determine whether the district court erred as a 
matter of law when it decided Jamal's motion for a 
preliminary injunction. Our review is plenary. See Olde 
Discount Corp. v. W. Michael Tupman, 1 F.3d 202, 206 (3d 
Cir. 1993). We review the district court's findings of fact for 
clear error. Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n v. Local 1291, 
909 F.2d 754, 756 (3d Cir. 1990). We first consider Jamal's 
request to enjoin the investigation and enforcement of the 
business or profession rule against him. 
 
Prison regulations that curtail an inmate's constitutional 
rights are valid if reasonably related to legitimate 
penological objectives. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 
107 S. Ct. 2254, 2261 (1987). The deference we accord to 
the Department in establishing, interpreting and applying 
prison regulations presents a formidable barrier to Jamal's 
claim that the prison regulations are unconstitutional. See 
Turner, 482 U.S. at 89, 107 S. Ct. at 2262 (noting that less 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Under DCM-812, an inmate's attorney may designate persons, such as 
law students, paralegals, or investigators to visit the inmate to act as 
the 
attorney's agent. The attorney is required to submit a "written statement 
signed by the attorney on the letterhead of his or her firm identifying 
each person as the attorney's agent and attesting that the visit is for 
the 
purpose of legal consultation." 
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stringent First Amendment scrutiny is appropriate in the 
prison setting because "prison administrators . . . and not 
the courts [are] to make the difficult judgments concerns 
the institutional operations.") Incarceration, however, 
necessitates that many rights and privileges, including 
rights derived from the First Amendment, be eliminated or 
curtailed. Pell, 417 U.S. at 822, 94 S. Ct. at 2804. 
 
In Turner, the Supreme Court listed four factors to help 
determine whether prison regulations and practices are 
reasonable: 
 
       "First, there must be a valid, rational connection 
       between the prison regulation and the legitimate 
       governmental interest put forward to justify it. Thus, a 
       regulation cannot be sustained where the logical 
       connection between the regulation and the asserted 
       goal is so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or 
       irrational. Moreover, the governmental objective must 
       be a legitimate and neutral one. We have found it 
       important to inquire whether prison regulations 
       restricting inmates' First Amendment rights operated in 
       a neutral fashion, without regard to the content of the 
       expression. 
 
       A second factor relevant in determining the 
       reasonableness of a prison restriction, as Pell shows, is 
       whether there are alternative means of exercising the 
       right that remain open to prison inmates. Where other 
       avenues remain available for the exercise of the 
       asserted right, courts should be particularly conscious 
       of the measure of judicial deference owed to corrections 
       officials . . . in gauging the validity of the regulation. 
 
       A third consideration is the impact accommodation of 
       the asserted constitutional right will have on guards 
       and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison 
       resources generally. In the necessarily closed 
       environment of the correctional institution, few changes 
       will have no ramifications on the liberty of others or on 
       the use of the prison's limited resources for preserving 
       institutional order. When accommodation of an 
       asserted right will have a significant ripple effect on 
       fellow inmates or on prison staff, courts should be 
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       particularly deferential to the informed discretion of 
       corrections officials. 
 
       Finally, the absence of ready alternatives is evidence 
       of the reasonableness of a prison regulation. By the 
       same token, the existence of obvious, easy alternatives 
       may be evidence that the regulation is not reasonable, 
       but is an exaggerated response to prison concerns. This 
       is not a least restrictive alternative test prison officials 
       do not have to set up and then shoot down every 
       conceivable alternative method of accommodating the 
       claimant's constitutional complaint. But if an inmate 
       claimant can point to an alternative that fully 
       accommodates the prisoner's rights at de minimis cost 
       to valid penological interests, a court may consider that 
       as evidence that the regulation does not satisfy the 
       reasonable relationship standard." 
 
Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91, 107 S. Ct. at 2262 (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 permits a court to 
grant a preliminary injunction if the moving party 
demonstrates a likelihood of success in the litigation, and 
that he will suffer great or irreparable injury absent an 
injunction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65; Delaware River Port Auth. v. 
Transamerican Trailer Tranp. Inc., 501 F.2d 917, 919-20 (3d 
Cir. 1974). Accordingly, to succeed on his motion for a 
preliminary injunction, Jamal must first demonstrate that 
the business or profession rule, as enforced against him, is 
not reasonably related to any legitimate interests. We 
conclude that Jamal has satisfied this requirement because 
he is likely to show: first, that the Department enforced the 
business or profession rule because of the content of his 
writings; second, that his writing does not affect the 
allocation of prison resources, other inmates, or the orderly 
administration of the prison system any more than does the 
writing of other inmates; and third, that there are obvious, 
easy alternatives to address the Department's security 
concerns. 
 
A. 
 
Prison regulations, like the business or profession rule, 
which restrict an inmate's First Amendment rights must 
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operate in a neutral fashion, without regard to the content 
of the expression. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90, 107 S. Ct. at 
2262. We analyze content neutrality in the prison context 
differently than we do for non-inmates. Jones v. North 
Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 133, 97 
S. Ct. 2532, 2541 (1977). For example, limiting speech that 
may include escape plans or incite other prisoners would 
be a valid response to a potential security threat,"even 
though the same showing might be unimpressive if . . . 
submitted as justification for governmental restriction of 
personal communication among members of the general 
public." Id. at 133 n. 9, 97 S. Ct. at 2541 n. 9 (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, once 
prison security is accomplished, "a prison inmate retains 
those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent 
with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate 
penological objectives of the corrections system." Pell v. 
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822, 94 S. Ct. 2800, 2804 (1974). 
 
The superintendent of the S.C.I. Huntingdon was aware 
of Jamal's writings when Jamal published the Yale article 
in 1991. An August 16, 1992 letter to the Department 
noted that Jamal was approaching publishers regarding a 
book deal. Nevertheless, the Department did not begin to 
investigate him until May 6, 1994, after National Public 
Radio sought permission to broadcast Jamal's interviews as 
regular commentaries. The district court determined that 
"the investigation was initiated after public complaints 
concerning Jamal's proposed NPR commentaries were made 
by the Fraternal Order of Police" and concluded that any 
delay in the Department's enforcement of the rule was 
attributable to its investigatory procedures. As a result, it 
held that Jamal was unlikely to succeed in showing that 
the action was in retaliation against the content of his 
writings. We disagree, and conclude that the district court 
erred. 
 
The Department began its investigation under public 
pressure to do so, and because of the content of Jamal's 
writing, not because he was being paid for it. Indeed, under 
the Department's own regulations, compensation is 
irrelevant in these circumstances. Furthermore, corrections 
officers permitted another inmate at the S.C.I. Huntingdon 
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to publish, promote, and receive royalties for a novel 
without punishment despite the business or profession 
rule. 
 
The Department states that the rule is justified by 
"multifarious purposes and the impossibility of 
accommodating the practice of a profession or business in 
a penal setting." (Appellee's Br. at 25.) There is no evidence, 
however, that Jamal's prison writing,4  any more so than 
that of other inmates, has strained prison resources, 
contributed to unrest among the inmate population, or 
enhanced Jamal's stature as a prisoner, resulting in danger 
to himself or others. To the contrary, the Department was 
able to accommodate a live radio call-in show to promote 
another inmate's book. From the record it appears that 
Jamal's writing affected prison administration only when it 
went through the mail screening system--just like the rest 
of the inmates' mail. Until it imposed its "mail watch," the 
Department did not have to make any special 
accommodations for Jamal's writing. As for the 
Department's remaining asserted interest -- ensuring that 
prisoners are unable "to carry on with life as usual," 
Appellee's Br. At 8 -- the Department has failed to explain 
how this interest is reasonably advanced by allowing some 
prisoners to publish books but not allowing Jamal to do 
likewise. Even if this interest might justify a rule that 
precludes inmates from receiving compensation for their 
writings, we need not resolve the issue whether this interest 
can justify a rule preventing uncompensated (as opposed to 
compensated) speech, because we conclude that it is likely 
that Jamal can demonstrate that the Department's 
enforcement of the business or profession rule against him, 
was motivated, at least in part, by the content of his 
articles and mounting public pressure to do something 
about them, and hence, the actions were not content 
neutral as required by Turner, 482 U.S. at 90, 107 S. Ct. at 
2262, and Pell, 417 U.S. at 822, 94 S. Ct. at 2804. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Writing also happens to have once been Jamal's profession, and he 
began to write in prison as early as 1989. 
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B. 
 
Jamal is likely to demonstrate that his writing neither 
requires accommodation by prison officials, nor affects 
other inmates or the allocation of prison resources. The 
Supreme Court discussion in Turner bears repeating here: 
 
       "In the necessarily closed environment of the 
       correctional institution, few changes will have no 
       ramifications on the liberty of others or on the use of 
       the prison's limited resources for preserving 
       institutional order. When accommodation of an 
       asserted right will have a significant "ripple effect" on 
       fellow inmates or on prison staff, courts should be 
       particularly deferential to the informed discretion of 
       corrections officials."  
 
Turner, 482 U.S. at 90, 107 S. Ct. at 2262. The record 
contains no evidence of such a "ripple effect." As explained 
before, Jamal was acting as a journalist from 1986, and the 
Department did not claim to be burdened by his actions 
until the Fraternal Order of Police outcry in 1994. 
 
C. 
 
Naturally, an inmate relinquishes some First Amendment 
rights that he would enjoy if not incarcerated. Jones, 433 
U.S. at 125, 97 S. Ct. at 2538. "The concept of 
incarceration itself entails a restriction on the freedom of 
inmates to associate with those outside of the penal 
institution. Equally as obvious, the inmate's `status as a 
prisoner' and the operational realities of a prison dictate 
restrictions on the associational rights among inmates." Id. 
at 126, 97 S. Ct. at 2538. Nonetheless, Jamal is likely to 
show that the Department's discriminatory application of 
the business or profession rule to his writing is an 
exaggerated response to the Department's security 
objectives because there are obvious, easy alternatives to 
address the Department's concerns. Id. If Jamal "can point 
to an alternative that fully accommodates [his] rights at de 
minimis cost to valid penological interests, [we] may 
consider that as evidence that the regulation does not 
satisfy the reasonable relationship standard." Id. The 
Department could simply apply its rule in a content neutral 
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fashion. Without listing all the other possible alternative 
rules, the Department could apply the business or 
profession rule to those businesses that place a substantial 
burden on the Department's staff, which would tend to 
exclude writers, whether episodic or notorious. There are no 
doubt many businesses or professions, which if practiced 
within the prison, would necessarily burden prison officials 
or other inmates. As long as the inmate/writer does not 
attain a special status, threaten corrections officers, or 
incite the inmate population, a more narrow rule could 
sufficiently protect the Department's security interests. 
 
The record does not show that the Department actions 
were motivated by concerns about escape plans, plans 
about ongoing criminal activity, or threats. To the contrary, 
it appears that Jamal's activity has not heightened tensions 
at the prison, and that his writings do not advocate 
violence, have any impact on the prison population, 
threaten corrections officers, or burden prison security 
resources. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 
S. Ct. 1861, 1878 (1979). Instead, the Department's 
business or profession rule is a class two disciplinary 
provision, and violations are punishable at the same level 
as horseplay or smoking. Although, Jamal's articles, book, 
and radio commentaries may have generated controversy 
beyond prison walls, unless they amount to fraud, 
extortion, or threats to those outside the prison, the valid 
objectives dwindle. Hence, we conclude that Jamal is likely 
to demonstrate that the Department's enforcement of the 
business or profession rule with respect to him is too broad 
to be justified by the concerns articulated by the 
Department. 
 
D. 
 
Turning to the second prong of the Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 65 test, the district court held that Jamal did not 
face irreparable harm as a result of the investigation of the 
business or profession rule. The court held that Jamal "is 
and has been able to disseminate his ideas through the 
written work to any and all outlets without direct 
interference from [the Department]." We disagree. 
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We have already concluded that Jamal has a reasonable 
likelihood of success in showing that the Department 
violated his First Amendment rights. "The loss of First 
Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, 
unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury." Elrod v. 
Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373, 96 S. Ct. 2673, 2689 (1976). 
This harm--the investigation for violations of the business 
or profession rule--was both threatened and occurring at 
the time of respondent's motion. Under Elrod, this is 
sufficient to show irreparable harm because the timeliness 
of speech is often critical. See id. at n.29. 
 
Importantly, Jamal is a condemned man, whose only 
time to speak and write is now. The Department has not 
disavowed its intent to enforce the business or profession 
rule, and Jamal has also unequivocally stated that he will 
continue to write. Thus, there is no reason to believe that 
the Department will not subject Jamal to the same 
treatment in the future. The district court held that the 
reading and copying Jamal's legal mail was acceptable if 
the prison officials had "a reasonable suspicion that 
plaintiff was violating an institutional regulation by 
engaging in a business or profession in which wittingly or 
not one or more of his attorneys was complicit." The 
Department argues in support that its decision to open 
Jamal's legal mail was necessitated by its investigation into 
whether Jamal was conducting a business or profession. 
This argument is nonsensical. We have difficulty seeing the 
need to investigate an act that Jamal openly confesses he 
is doing. Jamal's writing is published, and he freely admits 
his intent to continue. Continued investigation and 
enforcement of the rule invades the privacy of his legal mail 
and thus directly interferes with his ability to communicate 
with counsel. 
 
The district court's injunction is too narrow to protect 
Jamal from irreparable harm that results from opening his 
confidential legal mail. We conclude that Jamal has a 
reasonable likelihood of success in showing that the 
Department's application of the business or profession rule 
in this case violates his right to free speech. We will 
therefore remand the cause to the district court with 
instructions to grant Jamal's preliminary injunction, 
 
                                14 
  
preventing the Department from opening his mail on the 
pretext that it is investigating violations of the business or 
profession rule. 
 
III. 
 
Finally, we turn to Jamal's claim that the Department 
retaliated against him by restricting paralegal visits. Here, 
the facts show that Jamal is not likely to succeed on the 
merits, because the Department has articulated a valid, 
content neutral reason for applying more strict visitation 
rules to Jamal's visitors. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89, 107 S. Ct. 
at 2262. 
 
Indeed, the facts show that the Department had a 
legitimate reason to suspect that legal visitation privileges 
were being abused so that Jamal could receive more than 
the permitted number of social visits. Jamila Levi made a 
personal visit to Jamal during October 1993, visited as a 
paralegal in October 1994, as a social guest in January of 
1995, and visited as a paralegal four times in February 
1995. Levi marked herself as "friend" in the prison's visitors 
book even when she was admitted for legal visits. 
 
Jamal's visitation claim also implicates his constitutional 
right of access to courts. In such a case we weigh the 
extent to which his rights are burdened, against the 
"legitimate interests of penal administration and the proper 
regard that judges should give to the expertise and 
discretionary authority of correctional officials." Procunier v. 
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 420, 96 S. Ct. 1800, 1815 (1974), 
overruled in part on other grounds, Thornburgh v. Abbott, 
490 U.S. 401, 109 S. Ct. 1874 (1989). In Procunier, the 
prison regulation absolutely prohibited the use of law 
students and paraprofessionals. Id. Here, however, the 
Department has only asked for verification that the legal 
visitors are credentialed or employed by the attorney. Jamal 
has not demonstrated that the paralegal visitation 
restriction delayed or hindered his state court appeal. 
Visitation--whether it is legal or personal--may jeopardize 
the security of a facility. We must defer to the expertise of 
prison officials to assess the security of the facilities and to 
assure that legal visitors are properly admitted. Cf. Block v. 
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Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586, 104 S. Ct. 3227, 3234 
(1984). Accordingly, we conclude that security concerns 
outweigh any burdens placed on Jamal's state court appeal 
and affirm the district court's denial of Jamal's motion to 
enjoin the Department's visitation restrictions. 
 
IV. 
 
To summarize, we hold that Jamal is likely to 
demonstrate first, that the Department enforced the 
business or profession rule against him based upon the 
content of his writings; second, that his writing does not 
affect the allocation of prison resources, other inmates, or 
the orderly administration of the prison system any more 
than does writing of other inmates; and third, there exist 
obvious, easy alternatives open to the Department to 
address its security concerns. After considering all of these 
factors,5 we conclude that Jamal is likely to demonstrate 
that there is no valid, rational connection between the 
Department's application of the business or profession rule 
in this case and a legitimate penological interest. Thus, he 
is likely to succeed in showing a First Amendment violation, 
and we hold that he will suffer irreparable injury as a 
result. Accordingly, we will reverse that portion of the 
district court's order respecting this issue, and instruct it to 
enjoin the investigation and enforcement of the business or 
profession rule as it pertains to Jamal; and enjoin the 
Department from opening Jamal's legal mail to investigate 
whether he is violating the business or profession rule. 
 
We also conclude that Jamal is not likely to succeed in 
showing that the Department retaliated against him by 
limiting paralegal visits, and on this issue we will affirm the 
district court. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We note that neither party addressed the remaining Turner factor -- 
whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain 
open to prison inmates, See Turner, 492 U.S. at 90 -- and we have thus 
considered this to be a neutral factor for purposes of our analysis. 
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